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The Problem of Quantum Measurement
by Joseph F. Johnson
Math Dept., Univ. of New Hampshire
Abstract
We derive the probabilities of measurement results from Schroedinger’s equation plus a definition of
macroscopic as a particular kind of thermodynamic limit. Bohr’s insight that a measurement apparatus
must be classical in nature and classically describable is made precise in a mathematical sense analogous
to the procedures of classical statistical mechanics and the study of Hamiltonian heat baths.
Quantum Measurement as Thermodynamic Limit
It is not necessary to modify the axioms of non-relativistic Quantum Mechanics in
order to solve the puzzle of Quantum Measurement. In order to do so, all we need to do is
to take Schroedinger’s equation without any modifications as basic, imitate the procedures
of classical Statistical Mechanics, and use an explicit Hamiltonian dynamics that models
the amplification process. No measurement apparatus dispenses with some form of ampli-
fication, and it should not be a surprise that the key to the problem is to use the physics
of real measurement apparatuses.
Introductory remarks
Quantum Mechanics has various axioms, say about six or so. Three of them are
logically of the same structure as the formulation of Hamiltonian mechanics, and are de-
terminstic. Famously, the time-evolution of a quantum system, as long as it is unobserved,
is governed by the wave equation of Schroedinger, which is in its mathematical structure,
a deterministic equation. It describes a deterministic dynamics. But during the measure-
ment process, a stochastic dynamics supervenes, and only probability laws describe the
result of a measurement and the state of a particle as it escapes the measurement appa-
ratus. The problem of Quantum Measurement can be roughly stated as does Bell in a
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famous paper, “Against Measurement,” as well as other papers, where do we put the cut
in Nature that describes when one dynamical law rules, and when the other law rules?
There have been, perhaps, three main obstacles to solving the problem. Only one has
been purely physical. That one is the lack of writing down an explicit, time-independent,
matrix Hamiltonian which, even in a toy model, captures the properties of the amplification
process which are physically relevant to measurement apparatuses. This is achieved for
perhaps the first time in this paper. The other two are merely formal: as experts in
the philosophy of science know, there has been heretofore no widely accepted definition
of the concept of “probability” as it occurs in science, and therefore as it occurs in the
axioms of quantum measurement. We adopt one very close to Jan von Plato’s, and it
is a powerful argument in its favour that it, originally advanced purely in the context of
classical mechanics, works just as well in this new setting. It is close to the usual working
but inadequate frequency theory of probability, which again should be no surprise, since the
frequency theory of probability has worked well in science in spite of its logical circularity
(a circularity fixed by von Plato’s adjustments).
The last obstacle has been common misconceptions about the logical structure of clas-
sical Statistical Mechanics, but fortunately there are in some standard texts and standard
and influential papers an adequate discussion of this so we need only imitate the proce-
dure of, for example, the celebrated paper of Ford–Kac–Mazur. Each of these philosophical
points will also be treated in detail in the appropriate section of this paper.
A more careful examination of the logic of Quantum Mechanics and how the idea of
measurement could be rigourously defined within it shows, as we will see, that the crucial
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missing ingredient is a rigourous definition of “macroscopic.” This seems not to have
been even clearly noticed before. Imagine, as usual, that the amplifying apparatus doing
the measuring registers the result of the measurement by having a needle move along a
dial, pointing in a macroscopically visible fashion to different numbers. If we formulate
our task, as it has often been formulated, to be that of deriving the quantum-mechanical
measurement postulates from Schroedinger’s equation as applied to the joint system of
microscopic particle being measured, and amplifying apparatus measuring it, it has always
been said that the apparatus has various possible states corresponding to different positions
of, say, its needle in the gauge. These visibly different numbers or positions of the needle
are called, “pointer positions.” The dynamic variable of the apparatus that discriminates
between different pointer positions is called a (or the) “pointer variable.” It seems not
to have been realised that it was a wide open question what sort of mathematical object
should model such pointer variables, or what was the physical basis for making assumptions
about their properties. Our view is that no ad hoc assumptions are allowable, we must
give a rigourous definition of pointer variable in terms of the basic notions of quantum
mechanics and derive from Schroedinger’s equation alone whatever properties of pointer
variable we wish to rely on—always in a way according with experimental results and
physical intuition, of course. This is the main, or even only, novelty in this paper. Every
other idea has appeared in print before, only not combined with the other ones, or even
unfortunately in combination with usuitable ideas on the other ingredients.
Einstein had already suggested that the probabilities of quantum mechanics arose from
a fundamental deterministic dynamics in analogy with the way the probabilites of classi-
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cal statistical mechanics arose from Newtonian mechanics. Bohr already suggested that
measurement apparatuses and pointer positions were classical objects, not quantum, and
classically describable. Schroedinger had already suggested that Schroedinger’s equation
would not need to be replaced by a different deterministic dynamics. Daneri–Prosperi–
Loinger had already suggested that amplification by a macroscopic device in a meta-stable
state was physically key to measurement, and an ergodic principle of some sort was at
work. H.S. Green had already suggested that a device in a state of negative tempera-
ture was an appropriate model for the measurement apparatus. Schwinger had already
suggested that a negative temperature Brownian motion would amplify quantum motion
to a macroscopic level of classical motion in which the quantum uncertainties would be
negligible (although this was not in the context of quantum measurement).
But, for example, Einstein’s idea may have been irrelevantly tied up with the idea
that hidden variables were essential to classical statistical mechanics, an idea later refuted
by Darwin and Fowler. Green’s treatement of measurement involved postulating a proba-
bility distribution on the measurement apparatus, which is an unduly na¨ive way to ground
Statistical Mechanics. The Coleman–Hepp model of measurement both lacks the notion of
amplification and imports the techniques of Quantum Statistical Mechanics. (The ideas of
Quantum Statistical Mechanics are physically inappropriate to the problem of Quantum
Measurement if Bohr’s insight that measurement apparati are classical in nature is cor-
rect. Because the thermodynamic limit taken in Quantum Statistical Mechanics is still a
quantum system, not a classical system.) Bohr’s suggestion was usually phrased in terms
of accepting a dualism in physics or even the ‘cut’ in Nature Bell complained about. He
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failed to connect it with a thermodynamic limit, any definite dynamical content, or a pre-
cisely defined approximation procedure. He once more carefully specified what he meant
by saying that the measurement apparatus in classical. He meant that it could be usefully
described in an approximation in which Planck’s constant was neglected.
Precise statement of the problem
It is helpful to focus on Wigner’s formulation of the problem, rather than Bell’s. To
do this, we state the six axioms of Quantum Mechanics in Dirac’s formulation–assuming,
as usual, for simplicity, that only discrete eigenvalues with multiplicity one occur, etc. etc.
The first three axioms are the same as those of Hamiltonian Mechanics, with only technical
mathematical differences. The first one is that each closed physical system is described by
a Hilbert space and a Hamiltonian operator on that space, which is characteristic of that
system. That is, to each system is associated a complex separable Hilbert space H and a
skew-adjoint operator H defined on a dense subspace. These mathematical objects give
us all the physical information about that system. The second axiom is that the possible
physical states of the system are given by non-zero elements ψ of H, called wave-functions,
and if and only if ψ1 = cψ2 with 0 6= c ∈ C do they describe the same physical state.
The third axiom says that if the system is in the state ψo at time t = 0 then it will
be in the state
ψt = e
2πtH
h · ψo
at time t, where h is Planck’s constant, roughly 9× 10−37 hp-sec2.
If Quantum Mechanics were really the same as Classical Mechanics, this would be
all the axioms needed. One would operationalise somehow the lab procedures needed to
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measure the various ψ of various types of physical systems. But instead of this, Quantum
Mechanics introduces two new undefined, primitive concepts into the axioms. In Classical
Mechanics, what one measured were the states, directly. This is no longer true, one now
introduces a new undefined concept, supplementing that of physical state. One also makes
measurement a specific concept, although primitive and undefined, it is specifically different
from other physical processes.
There are three axioms about the measurement process. The first one is that to every
possible measurement process, there corresponds a self-adjoint operator Q such that its
eigenvectors, or eigenstates, form an orthonormal basis of H. Let the orthonormal basis
be {ψi} and let the associated eigenvalues be λi so that we have Qψi = λiψi. The only
possible results of the measurement process are the eigenvalues, λi. The next axiom states
that if the system being measured is in the state ψ and if the Fourier decomposition of ψ
is given by
ψ =
∑
i
ciψi
then the probability that the result of the measurement process will be λi is |ci|
2 if we
assume, as we may after an inessential normalisation factor is inserted, that ||ψ||2 = 1 or,
as we say, that ψ is normalised.
The last is the reduction of the wave packet: it states that after the measurement
process is over, the system being measured is in the physical state ψi corresponding to the
eigenvalue λi which was observed.
(Dirac’s original line of argument for it was based on reasoning using the principle of
continuity, Most physicists have given up interpreting this axiom literally. For this reason,
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we reserve discussion of this axiom for a projected sequel.)
Although many discussions of the problem of Quantum Measurement have focussed
on this last axiom, Wigner’s influential discussion does not. Most discussions or questions
that occur to the beginner about the problem of Quantum Measurement involve hidden
assumptions, often of a philosophical nature, in addition to the axioms. For example, by
now it has been realised that although the process is called ‘measurement,’ it must not be
assumed that there is, physically, some ‘value’ which is being measured in the sense that
it is pre-existing.
J.S.Bell has influentially intervened in this project several times. For us, the two most
relevant times are in his comments on the Coleman–Hepp model and, by extension, most
statistical approaches. And in one of his last articles, ‘Against Measurement’ in which he
critiques the standard approaches even more forcefully.
For us, his critiques come down to three points: The orthodox approach is not phys-
ically precise if it cannot give a physical definition of measurement apparatus in terms of
wave functions and Hilbert Spaces and Hamiltonian operators. (It should not be left to
the experience and tact of the theoretician.) The theory, in order to even *be* a theory,
must also be capable of being logically precise: assumptions must be distinguished from
theorems, and primitive undefined concepts must be carefully laid out at the start, with
all further concepts defined in terms of them. And the theory should be ‘about’ reality, all
of reality, including the universe as a whole with all measurement apparatuses included in
it.
(In particular about being logically precise, Bell makes two points which we will
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answer: the first one he phrases in terms of a cut in the world, although we will follow
Wigner’s phrasing of this problem, below, instead. That is, Bell points out that the usual
way of using the axioms of Quantum Mechanics involves introducing a cut in Nature, on
one side of the boundary, we apply the first three axioms, and on the other side of the
boundary, we apply the second three axioms. Bell claims that this is not logically precise
until the position of the cut in Nature is rigourously specified by its own axiom, specified
once for all and in advance . . . we prefer Wigner’s formulation of the illogicality involved,
which Wigner calls a dualism instead of a cut. The second point is that the measurement
processes should be either defined, or primitive, but not both . . . )
Notice that the orthodox interpretation of the wave function’s *values* at a particu-
lar point (as being related to the probability of finding the particle at that point in space
or whatever) is *not* part of the axioms. Indeed, when Born first introduced this in-
terpretation, it was not immediately accepted: the founders of Quantum Mechanics had
been working successfully with the axioms alone and without any interpretation of the
wave function except what we have given here, that it represents the physical state of the
system. Taking Bell’s point seriously, one must decide whether the Born interpretation
is an interpretation or a theorem. It is known that it follows from the measurement ax-
ioms, so if we succeed in showing that the measurement axioms follow as approximations
from the first three axioms, we will have clarified the status of the Born interpretation as
well, showing that if it is not assumed, nevertheless some approximation to it follows as a
consequence of the usual procedures of Classical Statistical Mechanics.
Wigner’s discussion has the merit of isolating a purely logical question, which has
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physical significance, and no excess philosophical baggage. We will, in recalling his discus-
sion, set up notation which will be used throughout this paper.
Consider the physical situation underlying a measurement process which obeys these
axioms. There is a ‘microscopic’ system, or ‘incoming particle’—we use these terms purely
for mnemonic convenience, for us they have no conceptual significance. In practice, the
system being measured is usually a photon or an electron approaching the apparatus from
the left, say, and if it were a closed system not interacting with the apparatus, it would
be thought of as a particle described by a wave function of its own. If, then, it were a
closed system, by axioms 1-3 it would be described by a wave function ψo in a Hilbert
Space Ho with an intrinsic, time-independent Hamiltonian operator Ho. Here and from
now on, the subscript “nought” refers to the microscopic system being measured, not to an
initial time or anything like that. From now on for definiteness we refer to the apparatus
as an amplifying apparatus so as not to prejudge the question of measurement. Now the
amplifying apparatus would, if it were a closed system, also have its own mathematical
objects, ψm, Hm, andHm. Of course some states of the apparatus are suitable for detecting
the particle, and others are not. For example, a Geiger counter may have just been
discharged, and unable to detect. Or unplugged, or broken . . . . We suppose that ψm is a
state where it is ready to detect.
We no longer believe that there is a cut which divides the quantum world from the
classical world, so we now believe that the amplifying apparatus itself is subject to axioms
1-3, as indicated, even if it is ‘macroscopic’ in the common-sense meaning of the word.
Furthermore, the axioms seemingly apply to the joint system as well. As follows: as usual
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in Quantum Mechanics, the Hilbert space describing the joint system is just
Hc = Ho ⊗Hm
where the superscript c stands for “combined.” If the microscopic system is in the state
ψo and the apparatus is in the state ψm, then the combined system is in the state given by
the wavefunction ψo ⊗ ψm. If there were no interaction, the dynamics of the joint system
would be given by the joint Hamiltonian given by
Hc = Ho ⊗ I + I ⊗Hm
where I means the (appropriate) identity operator. Since there is an interaction, then,
tautologically, we have that the Hamiltonian of the joint system can be written
Hc = Ho ⊗ I + I ⊗Hm +H
int
where Hint is a linear operator on Hc which is thought of as the interaction term.
Wigner pointed out what he called a dualism in Quantum Mechanics: the same phys-
ical set-up which we are discussing can be analysed in two different ways, and although
there is no logical contradiction or disagreement between these two ways, that is only be-
cause there is no way to compare them, either. Since the joint system is, at time t = 0, in
the state ψo ⊗ ψm, the joint system is, at any time t, necessarily in the state described by
ψt = e
2π( t
h
Ho·⊗I+
t
h
I⊗Hm+
t
h
Hint) · (ψo ⊗ ψm).
On the other hand, the amplifying apparatus is fitted with a dial, labelled with the
eigenvalues 0,1, say, for spin up and spin down (or vice-versa) and has a definite probability
for being in one or the other.
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The only reason these two analyses have not led to contradictory results is that there is
no way to interpret the one in terms of the other, and hence no way to compare them. There
is experimental support for both. Interpreting the probabilities as frequencies, as usual
in classical Statistical Mechanics, the measurement axioms are extremely well supported
provided only that one has a practical sense of when something is a measurement and
when not. Recent developments in technology are eroding our sense of this divide: it
used to be clear that measurement apparatuses were macroscopic and quantum systems
were microscopic, one never observed peculiarly quantum effects such as superposition
and entanglement except for microscopic systems. But with the advance of mesoscopic
engineering and quantum teleportation, this dividing line, really it was a demilitarised
zone, is finally being populated and explored, so the usual practical sense is less of a
useful guide in this regard. The axioms involving Schroedinger’s equation are very well
verified, experimentally, so much so that it would be an act of desperation to introduce
changes in the equation (such as have been proposed) such as non-unitarity, non-linearity,
or stochasticity merely in order to solve the problem of Quantum Measurement and not
based on experimental observation of new forces or effects.
One way of looking at the problem, a less helpful one than the one we will adopt,
has been to say that the first three axioms describe a linear deterministic dynamics which
applies to all systems as long as they are not observed or measured. Or, as long as the
systems undergo processes which are not measurement processes. They govern all physical
processes except measurement processes. The second triad of axioms govern measurement
processes and are non-linear, discontinuous (approximately) and stochastic. This way
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of looking at the problem sneaks in some unwarranted assumptions. This will become
clear if we take Einstein’s point of view (minus whatever notion he may have had about
hidden variables, which are now, and rightly, regarded as against our physical intuition,
and so are rejected by the program of this paper). In classical Statistical Mechanics, one
had deterministic dynamical axioms, and from these, by means of purely mathematical
methods, one derived probabilistic approximations. Our program, then, is to derive the
three stochastic measurement axioms from Schroedinger’s equation without making any
new postulates, simply using statistical mathematical methods of analysis of a quantum
system with a large number of component parts and degrees of freedom.
From this point of view, the dualism Wigner points to is a gap, the lack of a defini-
tion of measurement process in terms of the first three axioms, and even more important,
the lack of a definition of the phrase “the result of the measurement process is λi.”We
would like to say that the measurement apparatus, call it M∞, possesses a pointer vari-
able f∞. Probably M∞ will be modelled by a mathematical space of some sort and, if
so, then probably f∞ will be some sort of function (or maybe an operator on a space of
functions) defined on M∞. (The mathematical nature of M∞ and f∞ must remain further
unspecified in order to avoid introducing unwarranted assumptions.) We would probably
like to have that the statement “the result of the measurement process is λi” is modelled
by the behaviour of f∞, perhaps by its taking the value λi or something like that, but
these desiderata have to remain rather vague, because their further specification involves
making various physical and mathematical committments, and we need to keep these com-
mittments separate from each other and give each successive commitment explicit scrutiny.
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A later section of the paper will be devoted to analysing, at this level of abstraction, the
classical idea of the thermodynamic limit in the works of Darwin–Fowler, Khintchine, and
Ford–Kac–Mazur.
Wigner himself makes the experimentally unwarranted but philosophically tempting
assumption, quite explicitly, which he calls, ‘psycho-physical parallelism’ and von Neu-
mann, after him, does the same. For only this reason, Wigner goes further in specifying
the problem, and makes it insoluble. He assumes that our perception of the macroscopic
measurement apparatus’s giving the result λi must correspond to a wave function of the
apparatus or a more or less well-defined set of wave functions. Furthermore, Einstein’s
program suggests the opposite, since the thermodynamic limit of a sequence of dynamical
systems can be, and usually is, a dynamical system with a totally different state space, a
state space which is not in any obvious sense a limit of the other state spaces.
Wigner, instead, goes on to further concretely specify the problem as one of entan-
glement. Suppose the incoming particle is described by a two-dimensional Hilbert space
spanned by orthonormal wave functions ψε.
Assume that the particle has a spin up state described by the wave function ψ1
and a spin down state described by ψo. Assume that the measurement apparatus, when
plugged in, calibrated, charged up and ready to detect the particle, is in state ϕmo . Wigner
postulates that if the particle is in state spin up, then the apparatus moves, after a time
period, its pointer to point to ‘u’ and its wave function is then ϕmu whereas if the particle
was in state spin down, then the apparatus evolves to ϕmd , say. Hence the joint system
if in the state ψo ⊗ ϕ
m
o evolves after unit elapsed time to ψo ⊗ ϕ
m
d but if in the state
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ψ1 ⊗ ϕ
m
o , to ψ1 ⊗ ϕ
m
u . Wigner points out that the linearity of Schroedinger’s equation
forces that a superposition of states on the part of the particle leads to entanglement.
That is, if v = c1ψo + c2ψ1, then v ⊗ ϕ
m
o evolves to a state which cannot be written as
ψ ⊗ ϕm for any choice of states of the particle and the apparatus. Such tensor products
are called decomposable, and for them, and only them, do the particle and the apparatus
have separate identities. What we actually get is c1ψo ⊗ ϕd + c2ψ1 ⊗ ϕu and this is called
an entangled state. The axioms of quantum mechanics actually forbid us to interpret
this as if it were a classical mixture, as if it meant the joint system had a probability
|c1|
2 of being in the decomposable state ψo ⊗ ϕ
m
d and a probability of |c2|
2 of being in the
decomposable state ψ1⊗ϕ
m
u . To go somehow from this analysis *to* the forbidden classical
mixture interpretaion has been called by J.S.Bell, “the Philosopher’s Stone of Quantum
Measurement.” But to pose the problem in precisely these terms is to commit the fallacy
of misplaced concreteness.
It is a misplaced concreteness to assume that pointer positions are well defined sets
of wave functions of the apparatus. We will see that, granting that the measurement
axioms are only approximately valid for constructible amplifying apparatuses obeying the
laws of reality, this fallacy is much the same as assuming that the only approximations
which have physical validity are those describable in terms of the norm topology. But the
approximations of classical statistical mechanics, which Einstein had in mind, do not fit
into this misplacedly concrete paradigm.
In summary, we do not adopt the exact viewpoint of some on the problem. We do not
say that we have to define when the linear dynamics is valid and where the cut is which
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determines when the stochastic non-linear dynamics becomes valid. Instead, we wish to
derive the second three axioms (or approximations thereto) from the first three axioms.
The approximations, as usual, will be good approximations within a certain domain of
parameters, and less good or even downright bad, elsewhere. That is the point. We
wish to give a rigourous definition in physical terms and in terms of the behaviour of
its Hamiltonian, of which physical processes are measurements and which are not. The
definition will be, that a physical process is a measurement when the sort of approximations
we will derive are useful descriptions. This is totally non-subjective and non-circular. In
principle, this will lead to experimental consequences as mesoscopic engineering develops,
which can discriminate between this solution and others which have been proposed. In
particular, we accept that entanglement persists. Our model provides, in principle, a
theoretical basis for determining which observables will be able to detect macroscopic
superpositions and entanglements, and which will not be able to detect them.
Wigner’s paper’s formulation of the problem has already been outlined. We outline
his solution and show why it does not quite fit into our framework.
Wigner has proposed that the definition of measurement process is that a conscious-
ness is involved, and that when a consciousness is involved, in reading off the position
of the pointer on the dial, then a new, still undiscovered non-linear dynamical equation
governs the process. He has not generally been followed in this. His solution does not fit
into our framework because he does not derive this non-linear equation from the linear
one. But his acceptance of the philosophical dualism that separates consciousness from
unconscious matter, a dualism that goes back to Descartes and Malebranche and Leibniz
in modern times, is extemely interesting, and will have a role to play in philosophy.
Wigner assumes without proof that the measurement apparatus must have pointer po-
sitions that are describable by wave functions. The axioms do not assert this. Experimental
practice would be unchanged if this assumption were abandoned or contradicted. There is
a vast difference between ‘interpretation’ and ‘operationalisation’ and we will change the
interpretation of pointer position from Wigner’s without changing its operationalisation in
terms of laboratory procedures. The axioms do not force Wigner’s interpretation (which
is the usual one) on us since the axioms do not interpret themselves. The phrase, “the
result of a measurement process” is, just as is the concept of ‘measurement,’ an undefined
one, a primitive one. Operationalisation is the way we turn physical concepts or the math-
ematical models of them into concrete laboratory procedures. If one adopts a particular
operationalisation this may well impose various constraints on the interpretations that can
be consistent with it, but it by no means determines them uniquely. (And vice-versa, of
course.) We will end up by abandoning the philosphical assumption of psycho-physical
parallelism in favour of a much looser but still physically precise correlation. This would
involve modifying the Cartesian dualism cum parallelism to a dualism between mind and
matter which is not precisely parallel, but admits of various rigourous correlations which
are not one-to-one mappings. This is just as consistent with the experimental evidence
as is Wigner’s philosophical assumption. The assumption of psycho-physical parallelism,
which is a philosophical assumption, is a fallacy of misplaced concreteness.
Of course if we accept Einstein’s program as valid, we have to accept that the measure-
ment axioms are approximations to physical reality analogously to the status, in classical
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physics, of the approximations of Statistical Mechanics such as temperature and phase
transition, which are not exactly valid for finite systems but only are well-defined in the
thermodynamic limit. Probabilistic formulas are approximations to deterministic reality.
It should be pointed out that once we accept that the measurement axioms may be
satisfied approximately instead of exactly, there are indeed many kinds of approximation:
there is no experimental evidence to force us to choose the strong topology. (In this paper,
we are going to adopt the same sort of approximation as used in the classical statistical
mechanical papers of Darwin–Fowler and others. Coleman–Hepp adopt the same sort of
approximation as used in Quantum Statistical Mechanics and the theory of local algebras
and inductive limits of C∗-algebras.) Some of Bell’s criticisms are misguided on this issue,
he reasons as if only the strong topology is acceptable. But there are reasons why the
strong topology on the space of observables cannot possibly be of physical significance for
measurement, based on the Araki-Wigner-Yanase theorem (that observables with eigen-
values closer and closer together require larger and larger, without bound, measurement
apparatuses to measure them with a fixed degree of accuracy). We will discuss this issue
in the next subsection.
Bohr proposed that measurement apparatuses were classical. We explicitly implement
this old idea in what is a novel way: we find a thermodynamic limit of quantum systems
which is a classical system. This is in sharp contrast to Coleman-Hepp and every other
statistical mechanical approach to the problem of Quantum Measurement, which studies a
thermodynamic limit system which is still quantum. Bohr on numerous occasions asserted
(without proof) that the measurement apparatus and pointer positions implicit in the ax-
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ioms had to be a classical apparatus, or at least classically describable. In conversation
with Rosenfeld, he once explicated this further: the apparatus has to be such, that its
pointer positions are such, that it is a valid approximation to neglect Planck’s constant,
that is the precise meaning he was pushed to giving to his more famous phrase, “classical
in nature.” We implement this by introducing a renormalisation in our limiting process
that sends Planck’s constant to zero. As always (prior to the C∗-algebra approach), the
thermodynamic limit itself is unphysical, a mere mathematical convenience for easily ob-
taining good approximation to a physical system which has a large but finite number of
degrees of freedom. For an actual amplifying apparatus with a large but finite number
of components, and a small but non-zero value of Planck’s constant, the measurement
axioms calculated by considering instead the limit as the number of components grows
without bound and as Planck’s constant decreases to zero without an upper bound to its
reciprocal, are a good approximation for the purposes of pointer positions (although not,
say, for irrelevant aspects of the amplifying apparatus such as the radium paint foolishly
used to decorate the dial . . . ). But there are other considerations which suggest that
the measurement axioms are exactly valid only about an unphysical thermodynamic limit
of some sort, besides the correspondence principles and Bohrian tradition. These will be
discussed separately in the next subsection.
The goal of this paper is to show that Einstein’s program can be accomplished in a
way hitherto assumed, without sufficient proof, to be impossible. We show, by using a
more foundational approach to classical statistical mechanics, that hidden variables are
unnecessary. Referring to the list of desiderata and avoiderata in “Against Measurement”,
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this paper avoids all use of the banned terms environment, reversible, irreversible, informa-
tion, measurement. And, I might add, dissipative, decoherence, random, mixture, density
matrix. (For us, all systems are closed systems, all states are pure states, and all super-
positions are coherent, always.) The banned terms system, apparatus, microscopic, are
merely used as mnemonic labels and are not relied on to derive substantive conclusions.
The banned terms macroscopic, and observable are precisely defined in terms of acceptable
notions. By observable, we will mean an abelian observable as in classical Hamiltonian
mechanics, and we give this a precise meaning in terms of the axioms of quantum me-
chanics. The usual primitive notion of quantum mechanical observable is not used. Nor
do we study linear operators and their eigenvalues. The Hamiltonian is not regarded as
an observable at all, but simply, as in classical mechanics, as the infinitesimal generator
of the dynamics. We derive the usual probabilistic axioms about the results of measure-
ments from the axioms which do not involve the concept of measurement or observable.
In particular, although the whole approach of this note is statistical, we do not make any
statistical hypotheses. We make only deterministic hypotheses as is usual in any Hamil-
tonian dynamical system, but use statistical methods to study those systems. This will
become clearer by example.
Schwinger has written an important paper on the subject of quantum Brownian mo-
tion. He does not make any connection to the topic of Quantum Measurement. Never-
theless, there are important results claimed (but not proved explicitly) in the paper which
turn out to be relevant. He derives formulae for the interaction of a microscopic parti-
cle with a Hamiltonian heat bath at a negative temperature, which produces a negative
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temperature Brownian motion in the particle. He remarks that this motion amplifies the
quantum motion of the particle to the classical level, where quantum uncertainties and
non-commutativities are negligible. Hence, every key idea of this paper (writing down an
explicit Hamiltonian for an amplifying apparatus may not have been done before, but it
is routine) has been anticipated except one, the definition of macroscopic observable.
The self-restraint of the adopted program of this paper rules out the postulating of
open systems, since they are not allowed by the axioms. By definition, in the foundations
of the classical epistemological approach to physics, system means closed system. The
axioms are for closed systems only. Nevertheless, something should be said in this section
about the open systems approach to the problem of Quantum Measurement. Zurek et al.
and Zeh et al. among many others are prominent proponents of the open systems approach,
which makes the peculiar (from the point of view of Wigner and the axioms) properties
of Quantum Measurement depend upon the interaction of the joint system of microscopic
system being measured cum measurement apparatus with the environment in a way rem-
iniscent of the phenomenological approach to Hamiltonian heat baths, Brownian motion,
and other thermodynamic limit phenomena. Up to now, they have no experimental support
for their proposals, and also have phenomenological parameters which they adjust in order
to achieve this. They merely postulate a master equation of some sort, but do not derive
it from an underlying deterministic dynamics. This is entirely analogous to the difference
between the Langevin approach to Brownian motion and the Wiener approach. Wiener’s
approach allows us to derive the stochastic differential equation from Newton’s equations,
as shown by Ford–Kac–Mazur in an immensely influential paper. Wiener’s approach is
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adopted here, in imitation of the beginning parts of that paper. Bell would criticise the
open systems approach because of its use of undefined notions such as decoherence, and
this is a foundationally important issue to clear up: it is important to know whether or not
the problem can be solved without introducing new primitive notions. But whether Na-
ture uses one solution or the other cannot be specified a priori by foundational desiderata.
Although from our viewpoint it seems counter-intuitive to make the reduction of the wave
packet, or the decoherence of the entanglement of the pointer pointing to zero with the
pointer pointing to 1, a macroscopic superposition of states, depend on interaction with
a thermally stable environment coupled by only relatively weak forces to the apparatus,
this is a question for experiment. Recent success in quantum teleportation shows that
entanglement persists over dozens of miles with no specially quantum efforts to screen the
system from interaction with the environment.
This means that it is up to future experiments to determine whether the peculiar
behaviour of measurement apparatuses is due to their interaction with the environment,
or due to their interaction with the system being measured.
The Paradox of Degeneracy
In this sub-section we adduce new considerations, a kind of thought experiment in
taking the six axioms completely literally, which suggest two things: the norm topology on
operators is not physically significant for observables, and, the notion of observable might
be the result of a limiting procedure of some sort, only approximately true in any finite-sized
laboratory. We connect this with results of Araki-Wigner-Yanase. The similarities with the
status of phase transitions in classical Statistical Mechanics is striking, and suggests that
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the mathematical behaviour of an observable should be derived by a mathematical limiting
procedure (such as the thermodynamic limit) from physically realisable phenomena.
The principle of continuity has a long history in Physics, and underlies the notion of a
real variable. It states that small variations in the physical set-up of the lab should produce
only small changes in the experimental results. This has implications for the mathematical
model used to model the physical set-up and the experimental results. It might be thought
that this principle has been discarded by Quantum Mechanics, but this is not so. Dirac,
for example, appeals to it in justifying the axiom of the reduction of the wave packet,
in his analysis of repeated measurements. The impression that the principle is refuted or
discarded is based on a misunderstanding of what are the experimental results in Quantum
Mechanics, in the real world. No particular quantum jump or discontinuity is ever predicted
by the calculations of Quantum Mechanics, only probabilities or, equivalently, expectation
values. These probabilities do indeed vary continuously with continuous variations in
the physical parameters of the lab set-up. More contortedly, the observation that the
measurement process resulted in λi “this time” is not, strictly speaking, an experimental
result. Experimental results are, by definition, replicable, and this is not replicable (except
in the special case that the probability was unity). Observations that are replicable include
“it can happen that the result is λi,” or, “the probability that the result is λi is in between
.1 and .15,” and things like that. The result of a single physical process, occurring once, is
not an experimental result unless it is replicable. Nature and Heisenberg have taught us
that only the probabilities are replicable, therefore, only the probabilities are experimental
results. If Heisenberg taught us anything, it is that a physical theory should not be
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criticised except for disagreement with experimental results, and it follows from this that
a physical theory does not have to explain more than the probabilities. Therefore the
principle of continuity only applies to continuous variation of probabilities and expectation
values with continuous variation in physical set-up. There is no reason, yet, to suppose
that Quantum Mechanics violates the principle of continuity. But in the following thought
experiment, it will be seen that the mathematical model of the measurement axioms does
indeed violate the principle of continuity in a hitherto unsuspected way. We are going to
construct a family of observables which vary continuously in the norm topology, but yield
an experimental set-up where a certain expectation value varies discontinuously.
Briefly, if Q is an observable with degenerate eigenvalues and if Qǫ is a family (ǫ > 0)
of perturbations of Q which remove the degeneracy, then we consider the reduction of
the wave packet produced on the one hand by measurement of Q and on the other by
measurement of Qǫ as ǫ approaches zero. We obtain a discontinuous variation in the
expectation value (of a different observable) as a function of ǫ. This violates the principle
of continuity.1
However if one interprets the reduction of the wave packet as an approximation in a
specific way, it is predicted that this variation should be smoothed out.
Let H1 = C · | ↑〉⊕C · | ↓〉 be a two dimensional Hilbert space which is the state space
1 This is the only violation of this principle in Quantum Mechanics. The so called
‘quantum jumps’ are not discontinuous, except in slang. For only functions can be contin-
uous or discontinuous. But it is precisely in the conventional interpretation of Quantum
Mechanics that the result of an experiment is not a function (of anything). The probability
with which a given result will be observed is a function of experimental conditions—but
this depends continuously on the physical parameters, except in the case to be discussed
in this paper.
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of particle one. Let H2 be isomorphic to H1 and be the state space of a distinguishable
particle, particle two. Let ψ = | ↑〉⊗| ↑〉+ | ↑〉⊗| ↓〉. Let Q be the (degenerate) observable
“ ‘spin’ of the first particle,” taking eigenvalue 1 if the first particle has spin up and 0
if spin down. Now the eigenvalues of Q each have a two-dimensional degeneracy. Let
Qǫ| ↑〉 ⊗ | ↑〉 = (1 + ǫ)| ↑〉 ⊗ | ↑〉 and Qǫ| ↑〉 ⊗ | ↓〉 = (1 − ǫ)| ↑〉 ⊗ | ↓〉 (and be otherwise
unperturbed). This perturbation removes the (relevant) degeneracy. We suppose the
physical system is in state ψ. The results of experiments Qǫ pass continuously to those of
Q as ǫ→ 0.
But the reduction of the wave packet does not. If Q is measured, ψ is unchanged. If
Qǫ is measured, then there are equal chances that ψ jumps to | ↑〉 ⊗ | ↑〉 or that it jumps
to | ↑〉 ⊗ | ↓〉 but it never lands anywhere else in the span of those two vectors. Let R
be an observable which is zero on the zero-eigenspace of Q, and which has as eigenvectors
| ↑〉⊗| ↑〉+ | ↑〉⊗| ↓〉 and | ↑〉⊗| ↑〉−| ↑〉⊗| ↓〉, with eigenvalues one and zero, respectively.
If Q has been measured, then the expectation value of R is unity. But if Qǫ has been
measured for any ǫ > 0, the expectation value of R is half of that. This is a violation of
the principle of continuity which, indeed, is not an axiom of Quantum Mechanics, but
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seems physically warranted in this example.
It is well-known1 that the performance of a measurement that discriminates with in-
creasing precision between eigenvalues that approach more and more closely together re-
quires increasing resources (laboratory size, etc.) It would seem therefore, that the passage
from Qǫ to Q is not physically continuous even though it is continuous in operator norm.
One might hypothesize that the degree of validity of the approximation of the reduc-
tion of the wave packet rule to the behaviour of the actual, finite size, physical apparatus,
depends on three things which affect the convergence: the exact initial condition ψ, the
magnitude of the apparatus, call it n, and the distance between neighbouring eigenvalues.
Even if we neglect the first two of these, it is obvious that the third is variable as ǫ → 0
and so the variation of the expectation value will be smoothed out, as is easy to see.
Benatti2 has worked out a derivation of the smoothing effect from the general assump-
tions of the Ghirardi–Rimini–Weber approach to quantum measurement, which involves
replacing Schroedinger’s equation by a stochastic differential equation.
1 Araki, H., and Yanase, M., Physical Review, vol. 120, p. 622 (1960).
2 Personal communication
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Finally, we remark that it seems to be a common mistake to think that because ψ(x, t)
is not continuous, that therefore the principle of continuity does not hold in Quantum
Mechanics. Firstly, for fixed t, ψ is not a function, it is an element of L2 and its value at a
point is not defined, and so is certainly not physical. Rather,
∫ x0+ǫ
x0
|ψ(x)|2dx is physical—
but it is also a continuous function of x0 and ǫ. Secondly, for variable t, although it is
true that ψ has a jump discontinuity when a measurement is made, it is also true that
precisely in the usual interpretation of Quantum Mechanics, because it is non-positivistic,
ψ is not regarded as objective and physical: only the results of calculations using ψ in
order to predict results of experiments are. And here, as remarked above, there are no
discontinuities except in the case of a degenerate observable.
Even so, the fact that, at least in the C∗-algebra context, a measurement theory based
on taking the thermodynamic limit of the interaction between a (fixed) microscopic sys-
tem and a (variable) macroscopic measuring device has been constructed is encouraging.
Classically it is of course well known that for any finite point at which we stop short of the
thermodynamic limit, we have determinism. Only at the unphysical idealized thermody-
namic limit do we obtain probabilistic behaviour. So it seems likely that the same thing is
true for quantum systems. This would suggest, as a dependence on n, the same smoothing
effect we have predicted (as a function of ǫ).
It also suggests that the principle of continuity will hold at every finite point, and
that the discontinuities usually taken to be part of the structure of theoretical physics are
simply an unphysical artifact of the approximation procedure inherent in passing to the
thermodynamic limit.
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3. The Concrete Model of the Ming Effect
From now on, we distinguish between measurement apparatus and amplifying appa-
ratus. The amplifying apparatus we study will be an explicitly given quantum system with
n degrees of freedom, Mn, modelled by a Hilbert Space Hn and with a Hamiltonian Hn. It
approximates more and more to a measurement apparatus as n → ∞. The measurement
apparatus is a thermodynamic limit of Mn, denoted M∞, and is a classical dynamical
system. Its states are the equilibrium states of the thermodynamic limit, and are not
described by wave functions, its state space is a symplectic manifold, not a Hilbert space,
has no linear structure, superposition of states is a nonsensical undefined concept for it.
Classical mixtures of its states are possible, as always in classical Statistical Mechanics.
One can take the viewpoint that measurement apparatuses and processes are unphysical
idealisations of the only processes that are physical, the amplifying processes. This is a
valid logical interpretation of the measurement axioms (even, after some contortions, the
reduction of the wave packet) and it does not involve any change in the operationalisation
of the concept of measurement. In fact, it grounds in concrete calculations what used to be
operationalised anyway without justification: the fact that an amplifying apparatus must
be large before the measurement axioms are verified. A one-atom device does not perform
a measurement . . . or reduce the wave packet.
Let the state space of an incident particle be C2. This space has basis {ψ0, ψ1}.
For each n, Hn is the Hilbert space of wave functions describing the state space of an
n-oscillator system which is an amplifying device. We let Hn =
(n)︷ ︸︸ ︷
C2 ⊗C2 . . .C2.
In the presence of an incident particle in the state ψ1, the amplifying apparatus will
evolve in time under the influence of An (called “Ming,”since it leads to a bright and
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clear phenomenon), a cyclic nearest-neighbour interaction which is meant to model the
idea of stimulated emission or a domino effect. In the absence of a detectable particle, the
dynamics on the amplifying device will be trivial. This means that
Hcomn = (C ·ψ1⊗Hn)
⊕
(C ·ψo⊗Hn) and we put H
com
n = I2⊗An+ I2⊗ I2n . The
intuition is that ψ1 means the particle is in the state which the apparatus is designed to
detect. but ψo means the particle is in a state which the apparatus is designed to ignore.
It will simplify things if we assume n is prime. (The general case can be reduced to
this by perturbation.) Let q = 2
n
−2
n
(which is an integer by Fermat’s little theorem).
Let i be any integer between 0 and 2n − 1. There are n binary digits di with i =
∑n−1
0 2
idi and uniquely so. If {|1〉, |0〉} is a basis for H1, then |i〉n = ⊗
n−1
0 |di〉 form a
basis of Hn. The intuition is that the i
th oscillator is in an excited state |1〉 if di = 1 and
is in the ground state |0〉 if di = 0. We also write |i〉n = |d0d1 . . . dn−1〉.
We wish to find Ming such that in one unit of time the di are cycled as follows:
e
2pi
h
An |i〉n = |dn−1d0d1 . . . dn−2〉.
Choose a set of representatives bi such that every integer k from 1 to 2
n − 1 can be
written uniquely as bi2
m mod (2n − 1)Z for some 1 ≤ i ≤ q and 0 ≤ m ≤ n − 1, that is,
k = bi2
m+ j(2n− 1) for some j but i is unique. (Since 2n− 1 and 2m are relatively prime,
no matter how k and m are fixed, there exist unique bi and j satisfying this.)
Then each |bi〉 represents an orbit under the action of e
2pi
h
An . Re-order the basis as
follows: let vo = |b1〉, v2 = |b12〉, v2 = |b12
2〉, . . . vn−1 = |b12
n−1〉, vn = |b2〉, vn+1 = |b22〉,
. . . , v2n−1 = |b22
n−1〉, v2n = |b3〉, etc., up to v(q−1)n = |bq〉, v(q−1)n+1 = |bq2〉 . . . ,
v(q−1)n+n−1 = |bq2
n−1〉, but (q − 1)n + n − 1 = 2n − 3, so we have 2n − 2 basis vectors
accounted for. Let v2n−2 = |0〉 and v2n−1 = |2
n − 1〉.
Let V1 be the space spanned by {vo, . . . , vn−1}, let V2 be the space spanned by
{vn, . . . , v2n−1}, etc., up to Vq . Let Vo be the space spanned by {v2n−2, v2n−1}. The
Ming Hamiltonian operator An on Hn is a direct sum of its restrictions to the Vi. Its
restriction to V0 is to be the zero operator. Each Vi is isomorphic to V1 and we give the
matrix of each restriction of An with respect to the given bases.
Solving An =
h
2π
log


0 0 . . . 0 1
1 0 . . . 0 0
0 1
. . .
...
...
...
. . .
. . . 0
...
0 . . . 0 1 0


,
we obtain a cyclic skew-hermitian matrix, whose i, jth entry, −ih
n2
∑n−1
k=0 ke
2pii
n
k(i−j), is
approximately (if n is large compared to i− j) ih (i−j)
−1
2π
unless i = j in which case ih
2
.
As usual in classical statistical mechanics, the observables are all abelian, and are given
by measurable functions on the phase space, hence fn is an observable if fn : H
com
n → R is
measurable and f(cψ) = f(ψ) for c ∈ C×. In order to avoid confusion with the orthodox
primitive concept of observable, modelled by a linear operator, we will not refer to fn as an
observable and will not use the term ‘observable’ in our system at all. These measurable
functions are dynamical variables, as usual in Hamiltonian dynamics.
The intuitive picture is that this device is getting more and more classical as n goes to
infinity. So the energy levels get closer and closer, approaching a continuum, the oscillators
get closer and closer which is why the interaction, at a constant speed, travels from a
oscillator to its neighbour in less and less time. If we adjusted by rescaling the dynamics
to accomplish this, the entries of Hn would diverge with n. We rescale h instead, so that
it decreases as 1
n
, so that we have finite length and fixed density and fixed total energy.
This is typical of rescaling procedures in classical statistical mechanics. It is physically
meaningful because the thermodynamic limit is never physically real, it is only one of the
Hn which is physically real: n is not a physical variable, it is a parameter. Passing to the
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limit is only a mathematical convenience to obtain simple approximations for the physical
truth about H1.1×1023 . Since h is truly small, this yields valid approximations.
4. Classical Statistical Mechanics
The presentation of classical Statistical Mechnics in undergraduate, and even most
graduate, textbooks is logically incoherent and is inadequate for the purposes of answer-
ing Bell’s criticisms of the statistical mechanical approach to the problem of Quantum
Measurement. A logically coherent and adequate foundation for the subject was outlined,
with many special cases done explicitly and compared to experimental results, by Darwin
and Fowler in the 20’s. This approach was also taken up by Kolmogoroff, Khintchine, and
Wiener, in scattered papers on the ergodic theorem. Khintchine attempted a somewhat
controversial generalisation of Darwin and Fowler’s many examples, but we will not appeal
to the controversial part of Khintchine’s explanation, but only the unusually perceptive and
acute formulation he gives of the foundations of classical Statistical Mechanics as a pro-
gram. In its full generality, it remains today as one of the challenges to pure mathematics
to establish its scope of validity as a theorem, we do not need this.
The notion of thermodynamic limit employed by these mathematical physicists does
not seem to fit into the framework of topology. These methods were acutely, if disparag-
ingly, characterised by R. Minlos, “For a long time the thermodynamic limit was under-
stood and used too formally: the mean values of some local variables and some relations
between them used to be calculated in a finite ensemble and then, in the formulas obtained,
the limit passage was carried out.” But this is much the same as to say that a method of
double duality was employed . . .
The methods of Darwin–Fowler and Ford–Kac–Mazur are well supported experimen-
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tally. The results of the quantum measurement axioms are well supported experimentally.
It adds to the likelihood of the correctness of our analysis that the statistical methods we
will use in the next section are brain-damaged analogues of well-supported methods and
lead to well-known results.
It is also the case that these methods have been largely supplanted by C∗-algebra
methods and the definition of thermodynamic limit as infinite system (not as a limiting
process) of Ruelle and others. But these latter methods are less flexible, so far. So far,
they have only been used to study infinite volume limits. But these are not the limits
appropriate to Brownian motion. Besides this, if we take Bohr seriously, we want an
‘infinitely rigid’ limit, or ‘increasingly classical in nature’ sort of limit, and this seems to
involve smaller and smaller quantum units of action becoming located closer and closer to
each other, nothing to do with infinite volume. Doubtless the classical limit of quantum
systems we will construct in the next section could be fit into some kind of algebraic
framework, but because of the paradox of degeneracy, it seems that the strong operator
topology is un-physical, so it seems pointless to do so.
The Gibbs program is to derive the probabilities from a deterministic dynamics via
a Hamiltonian heat bath. When applied to the question of Brownian motion, it takes the
following form: for every integer n we consider a Hamiltonian system of one Brownian mote
and n surrounding bath particles. As n increases, we may wish to let the mote remain
at a fixed mass but let the other particles decrease in mass proportionately, keeping the
total mass fixed. Let each such system be labelled Mn, it is a symplectic manifold as a
phase space and possesses a deterministic flow on it given by the dynamics: given an initial
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condition vo ∈Mn, the system will be in state vo(u) after a period of time equal to u.
They study a particular dynamical variable fn on each system: the momentum of the
Brownian mote. Or, rather, its auto-correlation function,
gn(t) = lim
T→∞
1
T
∫ ∞
0
fn(vo(u))fn(vo(u+ t))du.
Or, rather, what would be equivalent if the system were ergodic, a phase average of
fn(vo(u))fn(vo(u+t)), instead of a time-average. That is, following Gibbs’s original vision,
they impose a Maxwell–Boltzmann probability distribution on the space Mn, supposing it
to be a heat bath in equilibrium at a positive temperature. (This has been superseded in
following papers.) Now, a deterministic flow taken together with a probability distribution
on the space of initial conditions yields a stochastic process, call it Pn. This yields, in
turn, a stochastic process on the momentum of the Brownian mote alone. Hence for each
integer n, they obtain a Gaussian stochastic process with auto-correlation function gn(t).
They pass to the limit as n→∞, which requires a cut-off and re-scaling procedure, obtain-
ing a function g∞(t) which they interpret as the auto-correlation function of a Gaussian
stochastic process, even though they have as yet no phase space or probability space for
the process to live on, much less the process itself. They show that this limit function has
no memory effects, even though the finite systems Mn each satisfy Poincare´ recurrence.
In fact, it corresponds to the Wiener process. They have thus derived the Wiener process
from placing a mote in a Hamiltonian heat bath at a positive temperature.
Let the stochastic process on each Mn as above be Pn. Let the Wiener process which
arose in the limit be P∞. If we regard their procedure as being somehow that the sequence
of Pn has, as a limit, P∞, then we have a notion of limit that does not seem to fit into the
32
framework of topology very well. It is very flexible.
Their paper has been very influential and further work has shown that the thermo-
dynamic limit is largely independent of the particular probability distribution imposed on
the bath, and robust with respect to the particular dynamics introduced on the Mn. This
is only to be expected, since thermodynamic limits are robust to the underlying dynamics,
because of the central limit theorem. In the next section, we will show that a stochastic
process arises even without a probability distribution being imposed on the bath.
In summary, then. The procedure of Ford–Kac–Mazur was a kind of double duality.
Given a sequence of finite classical systems, M comn , they did not attempt to find the state
space of the limit object from the state spaces of the sequence. Instead, they, before passing
to the limit, passed to the consideration of dual objects, (dynamical variables: of course
the auto-correlation functions are a species of dynamical variables). Passing to the limit
they obtained a candidate for a dynamical variable, which they regarded as the dual object
for an unknown dynamical system, to be sought. We will carry this out in our setting (but
using time averages for convenience).
5.The Statistical Analysis of Amplification
Should we study quantum, non-commutative observables, i.e., linear operators, on
each amplifying apparatus and then pass to the limit? For the reasons discussed in the
paradox of degeneracy, the strong operator topology on observables, which in our model
is the only relevant topology, cannot be foundational or of direct physical significance.
It probably arises as the result of a limiting procedure, so that the discontinuity in the
paradox can be seen as a non-physical artifact of invalidly interchanging limits in a double
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limit. Therefore we should study something else on each Hn and derive the observable
as a limit as n → ∞. Amazingly, the ordinary abelian dynamical variables suffice for
this purpose, as if the space of rays in Hn were to be treated as a phase space exactly
like in classical Hamiltonian Mechanics. Because only one measurement can be made
at a time, that measurement commutes with itself, so abelian-ness is not a restriction.
The non-commutativity of the quantum observables will arise out of the fact that the
different measurement apparatuses required to measure them force each sequence of abelian
dynamical variables to live on totally disjoint spaces, so that their commuting with each
other is a meaningless question. If one and the same amplifying apparatus can measure
two quantum observables, then they must commute. But this was already pointed out by
Bohr and Heisenberg.
Macroscopy and pointer variables
In order to do thermodynamics we consider sequences of observables which are abelian
dynamical variables, {fn}
∞
n=1. Each fn should have the same “physical meaning” relative
to Hn. It is unclear how to formalise this in complete generality. If each fn is “energy” we
are doing the same thing as Khintchine, Darwin–Fowler. Ditto if each fn is a phase average
of a measure of the fluctuation of energy of a single component. Ford–Kac–Mazur consider
the example where each fn is the momentum auto-correlation of one component. (It is an
important open problem, which is very difficult, to find the largest range of validity of this
procedure, which they do in concrete examples, and give an abstract definition which will
cover such a range.) But we have to consider a sequence {fn} which captures the notion
of “visible to the naked eye” or, “macroscopic.”
At any rate, we formally define such a sequence of fn to be macroscopic if whenever
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the sequence of norm one vectors vi ∈ C
2, i > 0, satisfies
lim
n→∞
fn+no(vo ⊗ vno+1 ⊗ vno+2 ⊗ · · · ⊗ vno+n) exists for some
no and some vo ∈ H
com
no
, then it exists and is independent of the choice of no and vo.
Many macroscopic observables, such as temperature, are not relevant. Only macro-
scopic variables relevantly coupled to the incoming particle are pointer variables.
The concept of a pointer variable is one that had resisted precise definition. The
intuitive picture has always been that of a measurement apparatus which, after amplifying
its response to the incoming microscopic system, makes a macroscopic needle point to a
number on a dial in a naked-eye fashion. If the measurement apparatus is classical this is
easy to define, but then it is not so easy to link it to a quantum mechanical Hamiltonian,
which is required if one is to build the apparatus out of the bricks that are available.
Wigner and others define a pointer variable as some sort of quantum observable which
is “coarse” in the naive sense of not varying much over a large subspace of a Hilbert space.
This famously fails to convert quantum superpositions into classical probabilities.
The theory of the Ming Effect uses a novel type of pointer variable: an amplifying
apparatus is one of the negative temperature systems such as Hn. A measurement ap-
paratus is the thermo-dynamic limit of quantum negative temperature amplifiers, and is
a classical dynamical system Ω∞. A pointer variable for Ω∞ is a macroscopic observable
{fn} for the sequence {Hn} as above, such that the expectation of fn is coupled to the
initial state of the microscopic system H0 and a fixed class of states of Hn (regarded as a
state of readiness to detect). The main result of this note is that pointer variables exist
that satisfy further the probabilistic laws of quantum measurement. (It seems that the
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condition of being a pointer variable puts strong constraints on the fn.) We now define the
family fn, which in the limit, becomes the pointer position of the measuring apparatus.
There is a basis of Hcomn consisting of separable vectors of the form ψǫ ⊗ |i > where ǫ is
0 or 1. Let C be the set of basis vectors such that all but a negligible number of the di
for i < n/2 are 1 and all but a negligible number of the others are 0. (This is the device
being ‘cocked’ and ready to detect. It is very far from being a stable state, in the limit.)
By negligible, we mean that as a proportion of n, it goes to zero as n increases. For wn
any norm one state of the combined system, let ci be the Fourier coefficients of wn with
respect to the cocked basis vectors, i.e., those in C. Define fn(wn) = 1−
∑
i |ci|
2.
Now we are interested in phenomena in the limit as n approaches ∞, yet one cannot
directly compare the arguments of fn with those of fn+1. Instead of comparing individual
values of these functions, one compares time or phase averages of the various fn as n varies,
in keeping with the procedures of classical Statistical Mechanics. (Phase averages would
be taken over the submanifold of accessible states, it is more convenient for us to deal
with time averages. Time averages have been made the basis for von Plato’s theory[25]
of the meaning of probability statements.) For any abelian dynamical variable f , define
< f >= limT→∞
1
T
∫ T
0
f(e
2pi
h
tHn · v)dt possibly depending on v.
Why time averages?
The Gibbs program usually starts here by postulating a canonical distribution of some
kind and considering phase averages. Ford–Kac–Mazur do the same. Work of Mazur and
Kim following on the above has shown that in the thermodynamic limit, the result is
largely independent of the initial probability distribution postulated. The heat bath need
not even be in equilibrium. It is widely felt, therefore, that something deeper is going on
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here. Wiener always used time averages to define the auto-correlation function, since for
ergodic stationary stochastic processes these agree with phase averages. If the underlying
deterministic dynamics were ergodic, the time averages would be almost independent of v
and equal to the phase averages. Khintchine has shown that for a certain class of abelian
dynamical variables, even if the dynamics is not ergodic, the phase averages in the limit
will be equal to the limit of the time averages for those particular dynamical variables.
Since we are passing to the thermodynamic limit anyway, the results of Mazur, Kim, and
others support Khintchine’s insight, although the exact range of validity of this principle
remains unknown.
It is standard practice in theoretical physics to prefer time averages to phase averages
for probabilities, and so if we take as our goal, to derive the probabilities of quantum
mechanics from the first three axioms, we need to calculate time averages. The standard
textbook of Landau–Lifschitz for example says that probabilities are infinite time averages,
and the probability that a system will be found in the region M of phase space is, by
definition,
lim
T→∞
1
T
∫ T
0
χM (v(t))dt,
where χM is the characteristic function of the measureable set M . (This can be criticised
from a foundational point of view, but it should only be replaced by a definition that yields
the same answers because the standard procedure is well-supported experimentally . . . )
and therefore we study the thermodynamic limits of time averages.
The reason Wiener always studied time-averages was because, as he and, after him,
Gelfand, pointed out, the idea of measurement in classical Statistical Mechanics is mod-
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elled by a time average, since the characteristic relaxation time of the measuring device,
which is macroscopic compared to the individual degrees of freedom, is almost infinite by
comparison with the time scale of the underlying deterministic dynamics. von Plato traces
this idea to Einstein, and von Plato’s ergodic theory of the meaning of probability makes
the probabilistic expectation of the value of f equal by definition to the time average of f .
There is no use trying to devise a probability distribution for the states of the amplify-
ing apparatus as a whole because we control quite a few parameters. In such a situation it
is standard[17], p. 50f., procedure to introduce the submanifold of “accessible states.” We
know that the amplifying apparatus is in a particular sort of state, a state of readiness to
detect. Only a small subspace, C, of the total phase space is accessible to the apparatus,
then. It is easy to see that our results are completely independent of which vector in C we
start at. The question of what probability distribution on the states of the amplifier could
be derived by analogy to Khintchine’s derivation of the canonical distribution, but carried
out for negative temperatures instead of equilibrium, is therefore irrelevant to the question
at hand, although of sufficient interest in its own right. It would, however, remove us from
the only published coherent theory of the meaning of probability assertions that is closely
tied to the frequency theory, von Plato’s ergodic theory of probability.
Let the incident particle be in the state described by any (normalised) wave function
in C2. Let it be v0 = a0ψ0 + a1ψ1. The amplifier is in the state |111 . . .000 > in C.
Consider f∞ = limn→∞ < fn >. Consider a typical trajectory in the manifold of
accessible states inside of Hcomn (i.e., states which the dynamical system can reach starting
from a state in C). It is elementary to calculate limn→∞ < fn >, it is |a1|
2. (Nothing is
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altered if we suppose the amplifier is in a mixed state given by some probability distribution
supported on the span of C.)
Why define this fn?
Up until now it has been thought impossible for a pointer variable to exist for any
model of this type that will agree with the probabilisitic axioms. We are about to succeed
in showing that this is not true, it is possible. How unique is it, and what other macroscopic
variables will *not* verify those axioms is a question which is too large to answer yet. To
be a macroscopic variable at all is a strong constraint, it means the limit of the sequence
g(vo, v1, v2, . . . ) = lim
n→∞
fn(vo ⊗ v1 ⊗ v2 · · · ⊗ vn)
is a tail event in the theory of probability, and there seems to be some kind of zero-one
law which governs these. But tail events are highly non-unique, and even if we add the
constraint of being a pointer variable in the sense that the macroscopic variable must be
correlated with the microscopic particle’s incoming sharp states, it is still non-unique. We
could, for example, take an indicator function on the manifold C and get a pointer variable
that would disobey the probability axioms.
There are intuitive reasons for selecting the sequence of fn which we explicitly con-
structed. The first one, which rules out the indicator function, is that the phase functions
in Classical Statistical Mechanics with physical significance are supported on sets of posi-
tive measure, not zero or negligible measure. The second one is that in the debate, which
exists, about whether the wave function is physical or not, one notices that although the
wave function may be rather difficult to measure completely with only one measurement,
at least one can get a physical grip on the |ci|
2’s, they can be measured by repeating exper-
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iments since they are, after all, operationalised as frequencies. So a physically significant
phase function could be constructed out of those amplitudes. Thirdly, the classical phase
functions which have thermodynamic significance are sum functions, sums of identical
functions of each degree of freedom, so it is natural to study something like the fn.
Continuing
We will next find a classical dynamical system Ω∞ which has a mixed state X , which
depends on v0, and a classical dynamical variable F whose expectation values match these
limits.
We search for Ω∞, F , and Xv0 as above, satisfying
∫
Ω∞
FdXv0 = lim
n→∞
< fn > .
Let the state of the (classical limit) measurement apparatus where the pointer position
points to cocked (and hence, an absence of detection) be the point P0. Let the Ming state
where the excited states of the apparatus are proceeding from out of its initial cocked state,
and travelling steadily towards the right, be P1. Then Ω∞ = {P0, P1}. The dynamical
variables on this space are generated by the characteristic functions of the two points,
χP0 , χP1 . Let F be χP1 . It is the pointer position which registers detection. The mixed
state of Ω∞ = {P0, P1} which gives the right answer when the incident particle is in
state v0 is the probability distribution which gives P0 the weight |a0|
2, and P1 the weight
|a1|
2. This is precisely what it means to say the the measuring apparatus will register the
presence of the particle with probability |a1|
2, and fail to register with probability |a0|
2.
As the discussion of foundational matters in Khintchine[17] makes clear, thermody-
namic limits do not really exist, and they need not obey the laws of physics. They are
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merely convenient devices for organising our thoughts about calculating clever approxima-
tions to answering questions about finite systems with a large but fixed number of degrees
of freedom. Since many approximation techniques for large n are asymptotic expressions
which diverge, it is merely a technical convenience to re-normalise or re-scale the question
with n to introduce convergence. There was no physical significance to the divergence
since n is not in fact a variable but a parameter. We renormalised Planck’s constant h to
be equal to zero in the limit, by letting it be proportional to 1
n
.
Of course there are many properties of H1.1×1023 which can not be well-studied by
neglecting h. But we have just proved that < fn > is not one of them. Thus, although
there are many topics in the physics of amplifying apparatus which would be poorly served
by taking the limit as h→ 0, the pointer variable is not one of them. Bohr had this idea,
in words. He said that the pointer position was classically describable, meaning that we
should be able to study it as part of the physical description of the apparatus which does
not vary appreciably if we neglect Planck’s constant. The method introduced by this note
is the only way yet known to make this precise. It, by coincidence, agrees perfectly with
the method of Khintchine and others following the Gibbs program.
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